INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the international investment law regime has expanded dramatically, particularly through an extraordinary increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that confer direct rights on transnational investors. and predicted a crisis in the system, the Argentine cases may well be precipitating that crisis both because these cases touch on the most fundamental policy choices of states and because, for the first time, an Annulment Committee appears to be catalyzing a rethinking of investor-state arbitration more generally through its own jurisprudence.
This article argues that the awards issued in the Argentine cases to date exhibit extremely poor legal analysis with substantive outcomes that do not reflect either the text of Argentina's BITs nor the intent of the state parties to those BITs. Moreover, the article suggests that these awards have the potential to undermine the legitimacy and authority of BIT arbitrations before ICSID and that, as a result of the CMS Annulment Committee
Report, some of the basic premises of investor state arbitration must be reconsidered.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief background to Argentina's financial crisis and the cases pending against it. Part III analyzes Argentina's legal arguments in these cases, particularly its invocation of NPM clauses in the U.S. 
II. THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
In the last weeks of 2001, Argentina experienced a financial collapse of catastrophic proportions. 2 In one day alone, the Argentine peso lost 40% of its value. 3 As the peso collapsed, a run on banks followed. According to The Economist, throughout the collapse, "income per person in dollar terms…shrunk from around $7,000 to just $3,500" taking office over a mere ten days" followed.
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In response to the crisis, which has been likened to the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, 7 Argentina adopted a number of measures to stabilize the economy and restore political confidence. Among these efforts was a significant devaluation of the peso through the termination of the currency board which had pegged the peso to the U.S. Significantly, however, both the jurisprudence and legal reasoning of these ICSID Tribunals is often problematic. Not only do these Tribunals essentially ignore the treatybased NPM exception and restrict the necessity defense, the findings of at least three of the Tribunals appear to overlook the basic bargain between investor protection and state freedom of action inherent in a BIT and, thereby, limit the state's ability to respond to exceptional situations, such as financial crises, in ways that that may threaten the longterm willingness of states to participate in investor-state arbitration and, perhaps, the legitimacy of that system itself.
The ICSID Tribunals and Non-Precluded Measures Provisions
While the four Tribunals that have issued awards in the Argentina cases reach different substantive outcomes and their decisions take distinct approaches to the function of NPM clauses, they agree on at least two critical points. First, the Tribunals interpret the essential security and public order provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT broadly enough to encompass economic emergencies, such as the financial crisis that enveloped 34 See Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶ ¶ 226-66 ("Argentina is exempt of responsibility, and accordingly, the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by the host State…."); CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 387. The divergent decisions raise the problem of an arbitral system without meaningful appellate authority and no means of resolving different outcomes based on nearly identical facts.
A second area of agreement between the Tribunals is their interpretation of the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT as not self-judging. 35 While the language of the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not explicitly self-judging, Argentina has argued that it should be interpreted as self-judging, again based on long-standing practice of the United States. The Tribunals unanimously reject this claim and, therefore, apply a substantive review to Argentina's invocation of the clause rather than a less strict good faith test. Despite the four Tribunals' agreement on the non-self-judging nature of the NPM clause, only the Sempra Tribunal gives serious consideration to the weighty evidence of the common intent of the United States and Argentina that the clause should be self- 35 Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶ 373; Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 388, 391. 36 The author has argued elsewhere that, due to the extensive US practice interpreting NPM clauses as selfjudging, the clause contained in the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be interpreted as self-judging and subject only to good faith review by an arbitral tribunal and not a full substantive review of the state's policies. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 26. 37 CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 371. 38 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ ¶ 226, 266; Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 337. 39 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 212. For example, the tribunal considers when the U.S. policy with respect to self-judging NPM clauses became explicit and finds that did not occur until 1992, after the U.S.-Argentina BIT was signed. Id. ¶ 213. Despite the agreement of the two tribunals that the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not self-judging, there is reason to question both tribunals' decisions. As noted above, prior to the conclusion of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the United States had asserted a self-judging interpretation of the NPM clause in its BITs.
judging. 40 Yet, even the Sempra Tribunal, notably composed of two arbitrators who also served in the CMS case, dismisses the relevance of that evidence and also concludes that the NPM clause is non-self-judging.
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Despite agreement on the applicability of the NPM clause to economic emergencies and its non-self-judging nature, the four awards differ on a number of significant issues.
A first key difference among the decisions is their approach to the relationship between the NPM clause in the treaty and the customary law defense of necessity. 42 The CMS NPM clause appears to be merely a textual restatement of the pre-existing customary defense of necessity that has no independent legal impact.
As both a legal and policy matter, the approach taken by the LG&E Tribunal is far more appropriate. Legally, reading the customary defense of necessity into the NPM clause both violates the Vienna Convention rule of lex specialis and the canonical rule that each treaty provision must be given effect. As a matter of policy, the incorporation of the necessity defense into the NPM clause fails to recognize the actual understanding of the U.S. and Argentina, whereby, in exchange for granting investors greater protections than would have been available in customary law, the states also sought to preserve for themselves greater freedom of action through the NPM clause than would have been available in customary international law.
A second area of significant disagreement among the four Tribunals is the level of deference they accord to Argentina's invocation of the NPM clause. While all the Tribunals agree the clause is not self-judging, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals apply a far more rigorous standard to the nexus requirement under the NPM clause, importing the customary law requirements of necessity and requiring Argentina to show that the actions it took were the only ones available to the government to respond to the crisis. Although the Sempra Tribunal recognizes that "it is not the task of the tribunal to substitute its view for the government's choices," its interpretation of the "only available means" requirement essentially removes all policy responses from the NPM clause exception simply by finding that there were more than one possible response to the crisis. 47 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal takes an approach somewhat closer to the margin of appreciation doctrine in European human rights law, according to which an international tribunal will give discretion to the state itself to craft its policies within a margin of international supervision. The LG&E Tribunal suggests, for example, that were it "to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina's determination would be subject to a good faith review anyway, which does not significantly differ from the substantive analysis presented here." 48 In essence, then, the LG&E Tribunal reduces the level of scrutiny of Argentina's invocation of Article XI down to something close to a good faith review and appears to afford Argentina a margin of appreciation in which to make its own determinations of the appropriate responses to the crisis. For example, the
LG&E Tribunal found:
Certainly, the conditions in Argentina in December 2001 called for immediate, decisive action to restore civil order and stop the economic decline.…Article XI refers to situations in which a State has no choice but to act. A State may have several responses at its disposal to maintain public order or protect its essential security interests.
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The LG&E approach recognizes the subjective nature of certain permissible objectives under the BIT and finds that states, rather than ICSID Tribunals, are often in the best position to craft appropriate policy responses to emergency situations.
A third area of substantive disagreement among the Tribunals is the question of compensation. While the CMS Tribunal did not find either the requirements of necessity in customary international law or the standards of the NPM clause met, it suggested that neither provision would, even if applicable, excuse the state invoking the clause of liability and the duty to pay compensation. 50 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal opined that "Article XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for exclusion from wrongfulness of an act of the State, and therefore, the State is exempted from liability." 51 As a 47 Sempra Award, supra note 33, ¶ ¶ 350-51. This approach fails to give the government any policy flexibility and does not recognize that some policy options may be more or less effective in responding to the crisis. 48 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 214. 49 Id. ¶ ¶ 238-39. 50 The CMS Tribunal observed, for example, that "the plea of state of necessity may preclude the wrongfulness of an act, but it does not exclude the duty to compensate the owner of the right which had been sacrificed." Hence, "in the absence of agreement between the parties the duty of the tribunal in these cases is to determine the compensation due." CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ ¶ 388, 394. 51 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 261. A second fundamental problem with the jurisprudence of the Tribunals in the Argentine cases is that it fails to do justice to the intent of the parties as expressed in the clear language of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. As the drafting history of the U.S-Argentina BIT indicates, the U.S. and Argentina included an NPM provision precisely because they sought to secure for themselves greater policy flexibility in response to exceptional circumstances than would have been ordinarily available under customary international law. 54 By failing to recognize the scope of the NPM clause as intended by the parties and drafted into the BIT, the Tribunals foreclose the very policy options that the U.S. and Argentina sought to preserve for themselves in extreme situations and provide investors with greater protections than the states intended to confer on them. The result is not just poor law, but also a direct challenge to states parties to BIT instruments with NPM clauses that forces them to ask whether ICSID Tribunals will, in fact, interpret BITs in a balanced way that conforms to the intent of the drafters as memorialized in a BIT. To the degree that such tribunals overstep the intent of the states parties and the plain language of the BIT itself, they may well chill states from entering into further BIT instruments and subjecting themselves to ICSID jurisdiction.
The ICSID Tribunals and The Customary Defense of Necessity
have a definite force and effect, and should be interpreted so as to have such force and effect rather than so as not to have it and so as to have the fullest value and effect consistent with their wording." G. In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal gives considerable deference to Argentina's own policy choices in response to the crisis, recognizing that an ad hoc arbitral tribunal is poorly positioned to second-guess the policies of the government. The LG&E Tribunal observes: "In this circumstance, an economic recovery package was the only means to respond to the crisis. Although there may have been a number of ways to draft the economic recovery plan, the evidence before the Tribunal demonstrates that an acrossthe-board response was necessary, and the tariffs on public utilities had to be addressed." 63 The LG&E Tribunal does not ask if a slightly different recovery package could have been employed, but merely determines that some across-the-board recovery package was needed. It pays deference to Argentina's determination that the specific policies adopted by the country were the most appropriate in the circumstances and finds that the criteria for invocation of the necessity defense in customary law were satisfied.
This approach is far more appropriate in that it leaves open the necessity defense as long as some other clearly available and less restrictive policy alternative would not have provided an obviously adequate response to the crisis with less harm to the interests of investors.
The final issue with respect to the invocation of the necessity defense in customary law considered by all four Tribunals is whether Argentina contributed to the situation of necessity. 64 The four Tribunals ask what level of contribution by a state to a crisis would be necessary to render the necessity defense inapplicable. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros
Government's choice between economic options. It is instead the Tribunal's duty only to determine whether the choice made was the only one available, and this does not appear to have been the case." Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 351. 63 LGE Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ 257. 64 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 28, at 25.
Projects Case, for example, the ICJ found the plea of necessity inapplicable because
Hungary had "helped, by act or omission to bring" into being the situation of necessity. 65 According to the ILC Commentaries, "the contribution to the situation of necessity must be sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral."
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The CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals all found that any contribution by Argentina whatsoever, including long range economic planning, was sufficient to invalidate the plea of necessity. In the words of the Enron Tribunal, "Although each party claims that the factors precipitating the crisis were either endogenous or exogenous, the truth seems to be somewhere in between with both kind of factors having intervened… his means that to an extent there has been a substantial contribution of the State to the situation of necessity and that it cannot be claimed that the burden falls entirely on exogenous factors." Therefore, the Tribunal observes that government policies and their shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis and the emergency and while exogenous factors did fuel additional difficulties, they do not exempt the Respondent from its responsibility in the matter." 68 As a result, these three Tribunals determined that the necessity defense was unavailable to Argentina because the state had contributed to the crisis.
Again, the LG&E Tribunal took a very different approach to the level of contribution necessary to exclude the plea of necessity, finding that even if Argentina had contributed to the underlying economic crisis, that contribution was neither significant nor intentional. In this respect, the LG&E Tribunal found that "in the first place, Claimants have not proved that Argentina has contributed to cause the severe crisis faced by the country; secondly, the attitude adopted by the Argentine Government has shown a desire to slow down by all the means available the severity of the crisis." 69 The LG&E Tribunal thus left the plea of necessity open to Argentina.
With respect to the applicability of the necessity defense, there is a clear split in the jurisprudence of the ICSID Tribunals to date. While the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals significantly limit the availability of the necessity defense and find it unavailable to Argentina, the LG&E Tribunal offers a far more deferential analysis of the state's invocation of necessity and finds the defense to apply in the case of the Argentine financial crisis. The approach taken by the majority of the tribunals thus far is, again, problematic because the analysis used by these three Tribunals essentially renders the necessity defense a legal nullity as a state will, almost without exception, have contributed at least in some indirect way to whatever emergency it may face and such a state will also, in almost every circumstance, have more than one possible policy response to such a situation. If this majority line of jurisprudence is followed, a state responding to a any crisis, with the possible exception of a truly unforeseeable natural disaster, despite the technical availability of the necessity defense, will be unable as a matter of law to successfully invoke the defense and liability will attach to whatever policy the state may chose to respond to the crisis. Again, as with the Tribunals' flawed interpretation of the NPM clause, the result may be to chill states' willingness to enter into BIT obligations or to subject themselves to ICSID jurisdiction. 
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Of course, the desire for uniformity of jurisprudence might suggest that such overlapping panels is advantageous as it is more likely to lead to consistent outcomes.
Yet, in a system such as ICSID that lacks appellate review authority, the repetition of particular arbitrators and, likely, their key holdings in numerous cases may confer greater legitimacy and precedential weight on particular lines of argument or legal conclusions.
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When panels have the same president and, particularly, when they have a decisive majority of repeat members, the likelihood that they will analyze identical facts and legal analysis differently in a second case, declines markedly. 75 What appears to occur instead is that the opinion of particular repeat player arbitrators in these cases is given additional weight as they decide nearly identical cases based on the same legal and factual analysis and thereby establish repeat, even if erroneous, precedents. Without appellate review, those repeat precedents gain perhaps undue weight and authority within the system. Tribunal's disregard of the agreed rules of law would constitute a derogation from the terms of reference within which the tribunal has been authorized to function… Disregard of the applicable rules of law must be distinguished form erroneous application of those 78 ICSID Convention, supra note 12, at art. 52.
rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground for annulment." 79 Argentina, therefore, argued to the Annulment Committee that the CMS award failed to state the reasons on which its conclusions were based and that the failure to properly apply the NPM clause (Article XI) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT constituted a manifest excess of power. 80 The CMS Annulment Committee first considered Argentina's claim that the Tribunal had failed to state the reasons on which its conclusion that CMS, the claimant, could enforce the obligations of Argentina to TGN, a subsidiary company. The Annulment
Committee agreed with Argentina, finding that "in the end it is quite unclear how the Tribunal arrived at its conclusion that CMS could enforce the obligations of Argentina to TGN….In these circumstances there is a significant lacuna in the award, which makes it impossible for the reader to follow the reasoning on this point." 81 The Committee therefore annulled the decision of the Tribunal on this point. However, due to the severability of the various parts of the award, the Annulment Committee's decision on this point did not impact the remainder of the award. that it has only a limited jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In these circumstances, the Committee cannot simply substitute its own view of the law and its own appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal. Notwithstanding the identified errors and lacunas in the Award, it is the case in the end that that Tribunal applied Article XI of the Treaty. Although applying it cryptically and defectively, it applied it. There is accordingly no manifest excess of powers. 86 What makes this Annulment Committee report so unusual is that the Committee had no reason or need to find that the underlying CMS Award was flawed with outcomedeterminative errors. Doctrines of judicial minimalism would dictate that the Tribunal should have decided the issue on the narrowest possible grounds, in this case a simple finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the award on anything but a manifest excess of powers and that, lacking such a manifest excess, there was no need for further consideration of the CMS Tribunal's legal conclusions. 87 Yet, the Annulment Committee "If the Committee was acting as a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award on this ground." 88 One can certainly read into the Annulment Committee's decision a critical wake-up call to the ICSID system that poor jurisprudence and lack of appellate review authority are an unsustainable combination.
Whether or not the Annulment Committee intended to throw the ICSID system into a crisis of legitimacy with the CMS Annulment Report is something we many never know.
The early aftershocks of the CMS Annulment Decision, however, appear to be having just that effect. In the weeks after the Annulment Decision, senior officials in the purportedly applying a rule of law, gets it so wrong that it must be regarded as having disregarded the rule and not really having applied it at all. The purported application of the rule must be so inadequate, and suffused with such fundamental error, that it transcends the mere commission of an error in applying the law and becomes instead a veritable case of its non-application. Argentine government have indicated a desire to reach an agreement with the U.S.
publicly clarifying the self-judging nature of the NPM clause in the U.S-Argentine BIT and have made clear that it will be an extreme political challenge for Argentina to pay more than US$130 million from the national treasury based on award that has been found to be legally erroneous. 89 At the very least, Argentina, like Bolivia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, may be rethinking its commitment to investor-state arbitration and the ICSID system.
VI. CONCLUSION
While claims about the legitimacy and viability of investor-state arbitration and the ICSID system are long standing, the Argentine cases present significant new challenges for the system as a whole. By failing to apply the NPM provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the majority approach in these cases has eroded the flexibility states parties sought to preserve for themselves to respond to extraordinary situations and may have undermined the bargain between investor protection and state freedom of action that at least some states parties thought they had agreed to in their BITs. Similarly, by narrowing the customary defense of necessity to what is effectively a legal nullity, the Tribunals have further encroached on the only other means for states to avoid wrongfulness and liability for actions that harm investors taken in response to serious emergencies. To do so through inconsistent judgments and with reasoning deemed by an annulment committee to be legally erroneous is all the more problematic.
If Argentina were to follow Bolivia's lead and exit the ICSID system, investor-state arbitration would truly face a crisis of confidence. If states do not believe that investorstate arbitration respects their rights, as well as those of investors, they will not consent to the system and that system itself will run the risk of collapse. Before that happens, a deep rethinking of the structure, purposes, and jurisprudence of investor-state arbitration is urgently needed. from the creation of appellate review authority to the use of the margin of appreciation as a decision-making framework for the evaluation of state policies that fall within core domains. Now is the time for an urgent consideration of these and other proposals to restore both state and investor confidence in ICSID before it is too late. At the very least, the Argentine cases and the CMS Annulment Report must serve as a wake-up call to ICSID arbitrators to engage in more careful and deliberate legal reasoning that does justice both to the texts of the treaties they are interpreting and the intent of the states parties which drafted those texts.
